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Abstract 
 
China is the largest solar photovoltaic cell producer in the world, with more than one third of 
worldwide production in 2008, exporting more than 95 percent of what it produces. The purpose 
of this paper is to understand the drivers of this success and its limits, with a particular emphasis 
on the role of technology transfers and innovation. Our analysis combines a review of 
international patent data at a detailed technology level with field interviews of ten Chinese PV 
companies. We show that Chinese producers have acquired the technologies and skills necessary 
to produce PV products through two main channels: the purchasing of manufacturing equipment 
in a competitive international market and the recruitment of skilled executives from the Chinese 
diaspora who built pioneer PV firms. The success of these firms in their market is, however, not 
reflected in their performance in terms of innovation. Rather, patent data rather highlight a 
policy-driven effort to catch up in critical technological areas. 
 
 
 
The authors would like to thank the Agence Française de Développement which supported this study, and all the 
people they interviewed and who contributed to this work. 
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Introduction 
There is a large consensus in the international community that effective mitigation of climate 
change will require the massive deployment of carbon-friendly technologies on a global scale
i
. 
Yet the very notion of technology diffusion remains a tricky issue in climate negotiations, as 
evidenced by the creation of a working group under the United Nations Framework Convention 
on Climate Change (UNFCCC) dedicated to this issue
ii
.  
 
In international discussions, the precise scope of technology diffusion remains ambiguous. It 
refers to the deployment of technology-based solutions to reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) 
emissions, such as wind turbines, solar panels, and nuclear power plants. But it also alludes to the 
transfer of the technical knowledge required to produce these turbines, panels or plants by local 
firms in developing countries. The latter interpretation of transferring knowledge is favoured by 
developing countries, and explains their request in climate talks for relaxing intellectual property 
rights (IPR). Although the deployment of technological goods is what matters to address climate 
change, the transfer of technological capabilities is indeed the key to developing countries 
obtaining a share of the green business pie. From a general interest point of view, it also reduces 
costs through increased competition.  
 
The case of the Chinese photovoltaic (PV) industry is particularly interesting in this respect. In 
2009, the deployment of solar panels in China had hardly started. Yet with more than 35 percent 
of worldwide production capacity in 2008 (of which 98 percent was exported), the Chinese 
domestic industry is the world leader in the production of PV cells and modules. In a nutshell, 
China has succeeded in acquiring the technologies for producing solar PV, without deploying PV 
systems in its territory. This case suggests that technology deployment and the diffusion of 
production technology are two distinct issues.  
 
The purpose of this paper is to understand the drivers and limitations of this Chinese success in 
mastering a production technology that had initially been developed in developed countries. More 
precisely, we will address questions such as: How did Chinese firms manage to acquire 
production technologies and skills? Have IPR impeded this process? Is China now able to 
produce new technologies domestically? The underlying goal of this case study is to derive 
policy lessons on how technology can diffuse successfully in emerging countries. 
 
We combine both quantitative and qualitative evidence. On the quantitative side, we rely on a 
dataset comprising 79,642 PV-related patents to analyse cross-country innovation and technology 
transfers in the different segments of the PV industry. To supplement this quantitative analysis, 
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we carried out a series of field interviews with PV actors in China
iii
. These interviews allowed us 
to further understand specific details of the economics of the Chinese PV industry, and provided 
qualitative information concerning the innovation and technology transfers to China.  
 
Our analysis also draws on the available literature on the photovoltaic industry. This includes the 
works of Yanga et al. (2003) and Marigo (2007). We also exploit a substantial body of 
professional literature published by public organizations (European Commission PV status report 
2003, 2005, 2008 and 2009; IEA, 2009; REDP, 2008), industry associations (EPIA, 2009, 
REN21, 2008) and consulting groups (McKinsey, 2008).  
 
The paper is organized into four sections. In Section 1, we highlight the position of China in the 
global PV market. We then characterize and explain how technology transfer is occurring from 
developed countries to China in Section 2. Then, in Section 3, we focus on the innovation process 
in order to see whether China is now a major innovator. Section 4 presents our conclusions. 
 
1 The global PV industry 
 
This section yields an economic analysis of the PV sector in order to recast our understanding of 
the role of China in the rapid development of the PV industry on a global scale. 
1.1 The demand 
The large-scale deployment of PV generation capacity, and consequently the existence of a mass 
market for PV modules, is a very recent phenomenon. Until the late nineties, PV systems have 
been installed almost exclusively off of the grid, for marginal uses (communication devices, 
satellites, remote habitations) for which PV electricity was competitive compared to other 
available off-grid electricity sources. As illustrated in Figure 1, the photovoltaic market took off 
around 1997 and it has been growing exponentially since 2003. Over the 2003-2009 period, the 
average annual growth rate was 45%. This acceleration is chiefly in industrialized countries, and 
mainly comprises on-grid installation. In 1996, 7.9% of PV systems were installed on-grid; by 
2007, it had reached 80% (REN21, 2008). 
 
Figure 1 Photovoltaic installation per year from 1997 to 2009 
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Source IEA, 2009 and EPIA, 2009. * forecasted. 
 
 
This fast deployment of on-grid PV systems has been entirely driven by incentive policies 
initially implemented in a limited number of industrialized countries (mainly Germany, Japan, 
Spain, and the US). PV electricity cannot compete on the power grid because it is more expensive 
than traditional electricity sources. Therefore, the development of national markets requires 
economic incentives. 
 
Besides various tax credits where the financial burden falls upon taxpayers, the main instrument 
aimed at stimulating the PV is the Feed-In Tariff (FIT). FITs consist of setting administratively-
fixed guaranteed prices at which electricity suppliers must purchase renewable electricity from 
producers. FITs have been used since 1994 in Japan and then introduced in Germany in 2000, 
inducing the healthy growth from 2000 shown by Figure 1. Spain also adopted a FIT in 2006 
which was so generous that it led to a market boom in the country in 2008. Spanish authorities 
reacted in 2009 by setting a cap limiting the deployment of PV systems to 500 MW per year. 
Along with the economic downturn, this policy change explains why the market growth slowed 
down in 2009. 
 
The majority of developed countries have now implemented FITs. A notable exception is the US 
in which 29 states have opted instead for the use of Renewable Portfolio Standards (RPS). RPS 
are mandates requiring each utility to have a minimum percentage of power that is sold or 
produced be provided by renewable energy sources. That is, they prescribe a quantity, not a price 
as in the case of FIT. 
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In contrast, policies promoting solar energy hardly exist in developing countries. Their priority is 
to find the cheapest source of energy to feed economic development, and therefore PV energy is 
mostly used in off-grid installations. In particular, China accounts for a very small share of the 
global PV demand (around 2.2% in 2009, Source: EPIA 2010). 
 
1.2 The supply 
 
Figure 2 presents the PV supply chain. The industrial production process includes four technical 
stages that are briefly described in Box 1. Then the deployment of the PV system requires 
combining the modules with complementary equipment (such as batteries or inverters) into 
integrated systems which, once installed, can generate power. As explained in the introduction, 
we focus our analysis on the first four production stages, Silicon, Wafers/Ingots, PV Cells, and 
PV Modules. They account for 60% of the average global cost of installed PV systems in 2006.  
 
Figure 2 PV supply chain 
 
 
Source: Authors 
 
 
 
 
 
Box 1: The PV production process 
 
The production of PV modules involves four technical steps: 
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1. Silicon purification from silica (SiO2) found in quartz sand. The ultra high purity required for 
the photovoltaic industry ( > 99.999% pure) is obtained through heavy and highly energy-
consuming chemical processes. 
 
2. Ingot and wafer manufacturing. An ingot – a cylinder or a brick of silicon – is grown from the 
pure silicon. It can be a single crystal, called monocrystalline silicon or monosilicon, or multiple 
silicon crystals that are smaller; a material called polycrystalline silicon or polysilicon
iv
. Then, 
using a saw, ingots are sliced into thin layers called wafers. Secondary processes like polishing 
are involved. 
 
3. Cell production. To form the cell, two differently doped wafers are assembled together to form 
a so-called p-n junction responsible for the photovoltaic effect, and the top and rear metal 
contacts are applied. Many treatments or modifications in the process can be applied to increase 
the efficiency. 
 
4. Module assembling. Cells are soldered together, the electrical junction being done by hand or 
automatically, and the cells are encapsulated in glass sheets to form a module which will be 
cooked in a laminating machine. 
 
Table 1 shows the market share of Chinese producers in the different segments. In 2007, China 
was the world leader in cell production and module assembling (35%). China is followed by the 
UE (29%), Japan (18%), and Taiwan (12%). This is relatively new: in 2003, China’s market in 
cell and module production share was only 1.6%.  
 
In contrast, its market share in upstream segments is much lower. China produced just 2.5% of 
the world’s silicon in 2007 (Winegarner, 2009) while the US, Germany, and Japan account for 
more than 80%. Chinese firms are however planning important capacity increases that will allow 
them to produce 15% of the world’s silicon in 2010 (REDP, 2008). These projects are strongly 
supported by the Chinese government, as we will see later. The pattern is similar for ingots and 
wafers:  China still represents a minor part of world production, but it is developing quickly, the 
annual average rate of increase in ingot production was more than 116% from 2004 to 2007 
(REDP, 2008).   
 
 
Table 1 China market share in different PV industry segments in 2007 
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Segment China Market share 
Silicon 2.5% 
Ingot and wafer < 5% 
Cells 
Module 
27% 
Source: Ruoss, 2007, REDP 2008, authors’ calculations 
 
It is interesting to relate these patterns to the economic characteristics of the different segments 
presented in Table 2. China is strong in cell and module manufacturing, the most competitive 
segments, with the lowest concentration as shown by the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) 
v
, 
and where profitability is low compared to the more upstream segments.  
 
Technological barriers to entry are relatively low in downstream segments, which have made 
possible the strong presence of Chinese firms in these segments. The cell production technology 
is easily accessible because, contrary to upstream segments, turnkey production lines can be 
bought and run without much prior experience in manufacturing cells. In this context, the relative 
low price of energy in China has spurred the creation of local firms in this energy intensive 
segment of the PV industry. Note that the size of investment costs in cell production has not 
prevented Chinese producers to enter the market. Module assembling is technologically simpler 
and it is labour-intensive, which gives Chinese firms a competitive advantage
vi
. In contrast, 
silicon purification requires advanced technologies and very specific know-how to control all the 
parameters of the chemical reactions, in order to be able to produce silicon at a competitive price. 
We will examine technology issues at length in later sections. 
 
 
Table 2 PV industry segments economic features in 2007 
 
Segment % cost in a 
panel
a
 
Market 
concentration 
(HHI) 
Investment 
cost
b
 
(millions/USD) 
Technological 
barrier height 
% of 
profitc 
Silicon 13% 0.19 140 High 41% 
Ingot and wafer 27% 0.24 95 Medium/High 41% 
Cells 27% 0.04 125 Medium/Low 11% 
Module 33% <0.04 25 Low 7% 
a 
Excluding the cost of ancillary equipments and the installation cost.  
b
 Investment for a plant with an annual production capacity of 1,000 tonnes for silicon purification, and 100MW for the 
downstream segments. 
c 
 % of the whole profit along the supply chain 
Sources: Ruoss, 2007, REDP 2008, adapted by the authors. 
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2 Technology transfers to China 
 
We have seen that China has strong positions in downstream segments, and has plans to increase 
its market share dramatically in more technology-intensive activities located upstream in the 
production chain. We show in this section that the rapid development of the Chinese PV industry 
has been made possible by the successful transfer of technologies form industrialized countries 
during the last decade. We discuss in decreasing order of importance the different channels 
through which the technology was introduced in China. 
 
2.1 The markets for manufacturing equipment  
 
From purified silicon to solar panels, products along the PV supply chain are very standardized. 
Market competitiveness mainly derives from the capability to manufacture products that satisfy a 
standard level of quality at an affordable cost. In this context, successful entry into each of the 
market segments requires access to state-of-the-art production technology. This in turn requires 
international markets for production equipment that is competitive.  
 
The number of manufacturing equipment producers registered on ENF website serves as a proxy 
of competition intensity in the market for PV manufacturing equipment. Table 3 presents each 
PV industry segment in November 2009
vii
. The first line gives the total number of providers 
while the second gives only the number of firms which provide turnkey production lines. 
 
There are a significant number of suppliers in each segment of the supply chain. However, the 
number is significantly higher in the downstream segments where Chinese firms have mostly 
entered the PV business, and thus the competition is fiercer. Downstream segments also present 
more suppliers offering integrated turnkey production lines that make it possible to start 
production with a minimum level of technical knowledge.
 
By contrast, equipment suppliers are 
scarce in upstream segments, which is a factor in why Chinese companies have difficulties 
entering this segment. 
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Table 3 Count of manufacturing equipment providers in the PV industry 
 
 Ingot Wafer Cell Module 
All firms* 70 178 335 234 
Firms providing turnkey 
production lines 
1 9 15 26 
* Firms selling specific equipment that are part of the production lines 
Source: ENF website 
 
Besides the importing of equipment goods, the purchase of manufacturing equipment usually 
involves the transfer of complementary know-how through training sessions of engineers and 
technicians operating the production line. This in turn progressively enables PV manufacturers to 
adapt their production chain to local conditions – for instance, substituting some equipment with 
a cheaper workforce. Several of our interviewees moreover indicated that large PV manufacturers 
tend to develop partnerships with equipment suppliers, sharing know-how and feedback to 
improve the manufacturing process. Although they may include temporary exclusivity clauses, 
such partnerships make it possible for equipment suppliers to redistribute this know-how to other 
customers, thereby accelerating the circulation of knowledge across the industry. 
 
Another evidence of the diffusion of technology generated by the international trade of 
equipment goods is the progressive emergence of equipment goods suppliers that are solely 
Chinese. This is illustrated in Figure 3, which shows the nationality of manufacturing equipment 
suppliers in each of PV segment in 2009. Although almost no Chinese firms are able to produce 
turnkey production lines, there exist a significant number of Chinese firms selling specific 
equipment. This has important implications as it allows Chinese firms manufacturing PV 
products to buy cheaper production equipment, provided that they are able to customize their 
production line by integrating specific Chinese equipment. 
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Figure 3 Countries shares in the number of equipment providers in each segment
viii
 (2009) 
 
Source: Authors’ calculation based on ENF website 
 
 
2.2 Labour mobility 
 
The circulation of a skilled workforce has been another key factor aiding the emergence of the 
Chinese PV industry. Recall that a major part of the technology concerns the operation of 
manufacturing processes, which mainly consists of know-how. In this context, the manufacturing 
experience of skilled employees is a key asset. 
 
Chinese PV companies have benefited strongly from the arrival of highly skilled executives, who 
brought capital, professional networks, and technology acquired in foreign companies or 
universities to China. For instance, the founder and CEO of Suntech, the China largest PV 
company, had been studying at the University of New South Whales in Australia, and then 
worked for the Australian company Pacific Solar. In addition, four out of the six members of the 
Suntech Board studied or worked in the US or in the UK. The CEO of the second largest 
company, Yingli, also studied abroad. In Trina Solar, half of the 12 person management team 
have studied or worked abroad: 4 in the US, 2 in Singapore. At Solarfun, the figure is 7 out of 10. 
On average, 61% of the board members of the three largest Chinese PV firms have studied or 
worked abroad
ix
. This highlights the importance of the Chinese Diaspora: 8 million Chinese 
people live in foreign industrialised countries (source: Overseas Compatriot Affairs Commission, 
R.O.C).  
Turn-key system   Specific equipment 
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To a large extent, this prevalence of executives with foreign training results from aggressive 
recruitment strategies pursued by Chinese firms in a context of scarce skilled labour locally. 
Suntech has a special program for recruiting foreign Chinese, while Trina Solar has created 
special “international staffing teams”. 
 
The local mobility of Chinese employees has also accelerated knowledge diffusion within China. 
Although the phenomenon is hard to quantify, representatives of three Chinese companies 
complained during our interviews about their employees being hired by other companies or 
creating their own company. Moreover, we also learnt that Chinese firms are developing specific 
programs to attract middle level management employees. There even exist agreements between 
the 9 biggest Chinese solar firms to prevent hiring each other’s skilled employees.  
 
2.3 Foreign direct investment  
 
The economic literature has shown for a long time that investment by a multinational firm in a 
productive asset such as factory in a foreign country also induces a transfer of knowledge, since 
the technology is operated directly in the recipient country.  
 
In 2009, China had attracted about one third of the global foreign direct investment (FDI) flows 
in the PV industry. Although massive, this is a rather recent phenomenon, which has not been a 
decisive factor in the emergence of the Chinese industry. Table 4 presents the top 9 PV 
manufacturers located in China. Only three of them feature investment links with foreign 
companies. Moreover, these FDI-based firms turn out to be late entrants, whose creation has 
followed in the footsteps of strictly Chinese pioneer firms.  
 
Although it was not decisive for the emergence of Chinese pioneers, incoming FDI is 
nevertheless likely to accelerate technology transfers to China. Figure 4 moreover shows that the 
proportion of joint ventures with respect to fully owned subsidiaries is much more important in 
China than in other countries. This reflects a general feature of the Chinese economy, where 
public authorities often force foreign investors to accept joint ownership. Such joint ventures are 
likely to induce more knowledge spillovers than the creation of mere subsidiaries, because they 
involve a local partner.  
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Table 4 Top 9 PV companies in China 
 
 Output (MWp) Creation FDI-Joint Venture links 
Suntech 327 2001 None 
Yingli 142 1998 None 
JingAo 113 2005 Australia 
Solarfun 88 2004 None 
Sunenergy 78 2004 Australia 
Canadian Solar 55 2001 Canada 
Ningbo Solar 45 2003 None 
Trina Solar 37 1997 None 
Jiangsu Junxin 35 - None 
Source European Commission (2008 and 2009) 
 
Figure 4  Regional repartition of the two types of FDI 
 
Source: Authors 
 
2.4 Licensing 
 
Another classical market channel of technology diffusion identified in the economic literature – 
and the most self-evident – is licensing. But it has played no role in our story as licensing is 
almost inexistent the PV industry. We are aware of only one case: Germany’s Johanna Solar 
Technology granted a license to the Chinese company Shandong Solar Technology in 2008 to 
build a production line. 
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3 Chinese innovation  
 
We have just seen that China has mainly acquired foreign technologies to create a domestic PV 
industry mostly through the international trade of manufacturing equipments and the hiring of top 
level managers trained in industrialized countries. In this section, we investigate whether China is 
now able to generate locally new technologies and inventions. 
 
3.1 A study of PV patents 
 
As a first measure of innovation in the PV industry, we tabulate patent applications
x
. Although 
patents do not provide a measure of all innovation, they offer a good indication of innovative 
activity and allow for interesting cross-country comparisons. Data on patents were extracted and 
filtered from the espacenet website, a free online service developed by the European Patent 
Office for searching information on patents and patent applications, available at 
http://ep.espacenet.com. Using International Patent Classifications combined with key word 
searches, we created separate patent indicators for each segment of the PV supply chain. More 
information on our dataset is available in Appendice 2. 
 
Figure 5 represents major countries’ shares of innovation patented worldwide for each segment of 
the PV industry in 2006-2007. China’s performance is impressive as it ranks third in all 
segments. But in silicon production it is all the more so, where it leads with 37% of world 
patents. Comparing these percentages with the market shares presented above in Table 1 leads 
again to distinguishing between upstream and downstream segments. China’s patenting activity is 
significantly higher in silicon production, ingot and wafer manufacturing than its contribution to 
world production (respectively, 2.5 and 5%). The reverse is true in downstream segments in 
which China is the second largest producer with a 27% market share (leader since 2008 with 
35%) whereas it generates around 15% of worldwide inventions. This suggests different roles for 
innovation in silicon production, ingot and wafer manufacturing on the one hand, and cell 
production and module assembling on the other. 
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Figure 5 Percentage of world patented innovation by segment and country in 2006-2007 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations 
 
 
3.2 Innovation in cells and modules 
The important share of China in globally patented innovation has to be put in perspective. Indeed, 
only 1% of Chinese patents are also filed abroad as compared to 15% for Germany, 26% for 
Japan, and 7% for the US. Since the foreign extension of patent applications is usually reserved 
for the most valuable inventions
xi
, this reinforces the hypothesis that the value of the average 
Chinese patented invention is quite low. This is in line with the low percentage of revenue that 
Chinese firms devote to R&D in comparison to western companies, as indicated by Table 5, 
which gives R&D expenditure for a selection of big PV cell and module manufacturers. 
 
Table 5. R&D expenditure in some major cell and module companies. 
 
 
Companies 
Country of 
origin 
R&D intensity 
(% of 2008 turnover) 
Segments 
Schott Solar DE+US 5.0% Cells 
Q-cells DE 2.0% Cells 
SunPower US + PH 1.7% Cells+ modules 
Solar World DE 1.4% Cells 
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Suntech CN 0.8% Cells+ modules 
China Sunergy CN 0.5% Cells + modules 
Solarfun CN 0.4% 
Cells + modules 
+ingots + wafers 
Trina Solar CN 0.4% 
Cells + modules 
+ingots + wafers 
Source Source: company annual reports 
 
Chinese firms then have a higher propensity to patent than their foreign competitors – they file 
more patent applications for an equivalent innovation output. Our field investigations in China 
confirm that local companies patent minor inventions intensively. The reason is not to protect the 
inventions – critical inventions are usually kept secret – but to send a signal to public authorities. 
In particular, the allocation of public subsidies by the National Development and Reform 
Commission (NDRC) is significantly influenced by the quantity of patents.  
However, concluding from this low patent value that Chinese firms don’t innovate could be 
misleading. As the interviews suggested that Chinese innovation focuses more on process, which 
is often not carried out in specific R&D departments but directly on the production lines, and 
protected by secrecy rather than patenting. 
 
 
3.2 Innovation in silicon production, ingot and wafer manufacturing 
 
We have seen that China’s patenting performance in upstream segments is impressive. This is 
particularly true for silicon, with 37% of the world’s patented inventions as shown by Figure 6, 
this results from a specific effort initiated in 2002. 
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Figure 6 Share of China in world innovation in each segment of the PV industry 
 
Source Authors’ calculation 
 
 
Why is it so? China only accounts for 2.5% of 2007 world production, but the government has 
voiced its ambition to dramatically rise production capacities in the coming years. Domestic 
production of purified silicon has already grown 16.5 times from 2007 to 2008 (from 1,100 to 
18,000T, REDP 2008). 
 
The Chinese patenting activity in silicon technology is related to this strategic objective. Besides 
capital investment in production facilities, the main barrier to entry in the silicon feedstock 
market is technological. The purification of metallurgical grade silicon into electronical grade 
silicon is based on the Siemens process – the principles of which have been public information 
for decades. The key to purifying silicon at reasonable cost, however, is in the efficiency of the 
silicon purification process, which requires precisely controlling the parameters of all the 
chemical reactions. Major western and Japanese silicon producers have developed advanced 
know-how in this domain, which they usually keep secret. In this context, the creation of a 
competitive branch of the Chinese PV industry in the silicon segment hinges on its domestic 
R&D effort to develop economically efficient refining processes. These efforts are chiefly funded 
by public authorities. Private patents represent less than 40% of total Chinese patented 
innovation, against around 85% in industrialized countries.   
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To summarize, the Chinese weight in patent applications in silicon purification, far from proving 
a technological leadership, actually denotes a massive domestic effort to break a technological 
lock in a strategic segment where the Chinese industry is still dependent on a small number of 
foreign suppliers. 
 
3 Conclusion 
 
China has become in just a few years a major player of the global PV industry. In this paper, we 
have tried to understand how this has occurred, and in particular, how Chinese producers get 
access to the technologies and skills necessary to produce PV systems. 
 
A first finding is that the economic importance of Chinese producers should not be over-
estimated. They are mostly active in downstream segments of the PV production chain – cell 
production and module assembling – where barriers to entry are low, competition is tough and 
profit margins are thin. Western companies continue to lead upstream markets – in silicon 
purification, ingot and wafer manufacturing – where technological skills are key assets. This 
global division of labour between China and developed countries in this industry is observed in 
many industrial sectors. Note that China has ambitious plans of new production capacities in 
upstream segments, in particular silicon production, in the coming years. 
 
China has acquired the technologies to produce cells and modules through two main channels: 
the purchase of manufacturing equipment – in particular turnkey production lines – on a 
competitive international market and the recruitment of skilled Chinese entrepreneurs from the 
Chinese Diaspora who have managed to build pioneer PV firms, exploiting China’s comparative 
advantage of cheap labour and energy in PV cells and module segments. In contrast, the lack of 
competitive supply of production equipment appears to have been a significant barrier to the 
development of Chinese firms in the upstream silicon segment. 
 
Foreign Direct Investments, mainly through the establishment of joint-ventures with western 
partners, are another potential channel for importing technologies. They are very significant in 
the Chinese PV industry but they are quite recent and they do not involve pioneering Chinese 
companies. This suggests that they have played a minor role in the emergence of the industry. 
The trade of intellectual property rights such as licensing has played no role. More generally, the 
existence of property rights has not impeded the emergence of the Chinese industry.  
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As measured by patent statistics, the innovative performance of China denotes a policy-driven 
effort to catch up rather than a dynamism of local companies. Chinese producers of cells and 
modules invest less in R&D than their competitors in Japan and Western countries, and 
consequently file fewer patents that are of lesser value. By contrast, the important share of China 
in world patents in the silicon, ingot and wafer segments is largely accounted for by public 
research institutions, denoting an effort to break the technology barriers preventing firms from 
entering these segments. Although it is too early to predict a success, this trend highlights the 
ability of the Chinese public authorities to intervene selectively when the market fails to generate 
technology transfers.  
 
In terms of policy implications, our research suggests that, in order to diffuse clean technologies 
to emerging economies, a key issue is the need to create an attractive environment for investment 
and international trade. In this respect, the focus of international discussions on intellectual 
property seems misplaced. Of course, one should be very cautious when generalizing results 
obtained from one particular sector. But this is in line with other works by Barton (2007) and by 
Kirkegaard et al. (2009) who studied solar, biofuel and wind technologies. In fact, the underlying 
reason is the same: the competition is sufficient in these sectors to prevent a single company from 
creating a lock on the technology with patents. 
 
Here at the end of this paper, it is also possible to address a more fundamental question: what is 
the rationale for promoting the transfer of production technologies to the South, from a general 
interest perspective? The example of the PV sector shows that this transfer does not necessarily 
induce GHG emissions abatement in emerging economies: China has successfully entered the PV 
market without deploying panels at home. In fact, the real justification is that the transfer of 
technology is necessary in order to transfer production capacities to emerging economies and this 
relocation can decrease production costs and prices through fiercer competition, as is true in 
many other industrial sectors. Ultimately, technology transfers will reduce the cost of mitigating 
greenhouse gas emissions. 
 
From the perspective of industrialized countries, this is disturbing. Of course, they benefit from 
these cost reductions, as demonstrated by the commercial success of Chinese panels in Spain and 
Germany. But while they drive the demand trough costly incentive policies, their companies face 
tougher competitors and lose market shares – again, see the situation of the German PV company 
Q-Cells which have faced severe difficulties in the last years. 
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Appendices 
Appendice 1: List of firms where interviews have been carried out 
 
Firms 
Nb 
Employees 
Activity 
Creation 
Year 
Turnover 
 (Millions 
of USD) 
2008 cell 
production 
World 
rank 
Suntech 8000 cell+Module 2001 278M 1000 3 
TRINA Solar 5200 ingot+wafer+cell+modules 1997 150M 450 11 
Solarfun Power 1500 ingot+wafer+cell+modules 2004 576M 200 12 
China Sunergy 
(CEEG) 5000 ingot+wafer+cell+modules 1990 149.5 111 20 
Topsolar 800 cell+Module 2002 175 48 38 
ST Solar  125 modules 2003 n.a. 25 >50 
Universal Solar 120 modules 2003 53 25 >50 
Chaori Solar  1100 ingot+wafer+cell+modules 2001 n.a. 22.5 >50 
Solar Energy 
(SSEC) 560 ingot+wafer+cell+modules 2000 n.a. 20 >50 
       
University 
Shiaotong University, Institute of Solar Energy     
 
Source: Interviews, ENF website, firms’ websites, and PV report 2009 
 
 
Appendice 2 Methodology: The patent as an indicator of the innovation and 
technology transfer 
 
Innovation cannot be measured directly like other variables. Several indicators have therefore 
been developed to measure it. One is the measure of the input (R&D expenditure, number of staff 
in the R&D department), but such information is difficult to find, is aggregated, and only 
measures the input while the output can be preferable (Dechezleprêtre et al. 2010). Measure of 
the output can be done by studying the data on patents. This indicator has many advantages as it 
allows to have disaggregated information by technology, and also gives information about where 
the innovation is patented, which is necessary to study technology transfer. 
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As represented in Figure 6, if a person (or firm) innovates, it can decide to patent the invention in 
one or several countries, which will give him the exclusive right to commercially exploit that 
invention in those countries. In a single country, one or several patents can be granted to protect 
the invention according to its importance and the characteristics of the patent office of the 
country. The heterogeneity of national patent laws makes it difficult to make reliable cross-
country comparisons. We deal with this classical problem by counting patent families, i.e. the set 
of patents granted for the invention in the different countries.  
 
Figure 7 Schema of a patent family 
 
Following the method developed by Dechezleprêtre et al. (2010), the indicator used to measure 
the quantity of innovation or technology diffusion process is then based on the number of 
families, that is to say the number of inventions. 
 
However, a variable quantity of innovation can be embedded in those inventions. To take that 
into consideration, we use as a proxy of the “size” of the invention the number of patents granted 
in one country for this invention multiplied by the average patent breath in this country. The 
patent breadth of one country is the average “size” of the patents registered in the patent office of 
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the country. In our example, the same invention has been protected by three patents in country A, 
while only 2 in country B. That it to say that with this single case, patent breadth in country A is 
2/3 of that of country B. In our study, countries patent breadths have been computed using the US 
benchmark: for each countries “c”, we kept only the patent families where patents have been at 
least granted in the US and in country c, and the patent breadth of country c is then defined as 
 (1) 
If the invention i has been patented in only one country (most of the case), the “size” of this 
invention (quantity of innovation embedded the invention) is then approximated by: 
 
 (2) 
 
Where  is the number of patents granted for invention i in country c. 
If the invention has been patented in several countries, the size of the invention is then 
approximated by the average of (2), that is: 
 
 (3) 
 
Having this information, one can then approximate the innovation done by one country c in one 
year y in one segment s by summing the sizes of all the inventions done by this country, this year, 
in this segment  (  ) 
 
 (4) 
 
The technology transfer can be approximated the same way by keeping only the inventions that 
have been patented in a chosen country. 
 
Limits of the indicator 
 
Inventions do not have uniformly equal value, but this value can be approximated by the 
percentage of international families (meaning a patent that has been granted in at least two 
countries). Indeed, after the first patent application, the applicant has two years to patent the 
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invention in other countries. The first application can only be an option for future commercial 
application while if the invention is patented in other countries, it proves that the applicant really 
shows some commercial interest in it. There is then a big gap in value between a patent that has 
been granted only in one country, and patents that have been granted in two or more countries. 
 
A second, more difficult methodological issue is due to the fact that not all innovations are 
patented in practice. This is especially true for process innovations, which are often kept secret 
(Cohen et al., 2000). Since an important part of PV innovations concern manufacturing processes, 
this implies that our patent indicators probably do not account for all inventions. 
 
 
 
Database used 
 
We built our dataset by downloading patent information from the espacenet website
xii
. For this 
purpose, we choose research criteria designed for all PV segments in order to obtain the biggest 
part of the relevant patents (corresponding to the technology) while having as few irrelevant 
patents as possible. Not having every patents doesn’t matter as the sample is still representative, 
but having too much irrelevant patents is more problematic. This can be limited by using proper 
research criteria. Here are the research criteria used: 
 
Keyword(s) in title or abstract: 
International Patent Classification (IPC) 
code: 
Silicon purification 
Silicon  C01B33 not C01B33/02  
Ingot 
Silicon  C01B33/02 OR C30B 
Wafer 
silicon wafer not semiconductor ?  H01L21  
wafer B24 OR B28 
Cell 
(solar cell?) or photovoltaic not module  H01L 
Module 
PV or solar or photovoltaic and module  H01L 
 
 
We note that the fact that we obtain a different proportion of the patents really granted in each 
segment doesn’t matter, as no absolute comparison will be done for the reasons explained in the 
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previous section. We obtained 79,642 patents, published before 2010, covering the PV industry 
from silicon purification to module assembling. 
 
 
                                                
i
 The Bali Road Map mentions for instance technology diffusion as a strategic objective. 
ii
 As the Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-term Cooperative Action under the Convention (AWG-LCA) created in 
2009 under the UNFCCC (see http://unfccc.int/meetings/items/4381.php) 
iii
 You can refer to Annex 1 for more information concerning interviewed actors. 
iv
 The monosilicon conversion leads to more efficient PV cells, but has large power consumption and is thus more 
expensive than the polysilicon process. Dopant impurity atoms such as boron or phosphorus can be added to the 
molten silicon in precise amounts in order to dope the silicon, thus changing it into n-type or p-type silicon. 
v
 The HHI is defined as the sum of the squares of the market shares of the largest firms within the industry, where 
the market shares are expressed as fractions. The result is proportional to the average market share, weighted by 
market share. As such, it can range from 0 to 1, moving from a huge number of very small firms to a single 
monopolistic producer. 
vi
 According to Chinese Firms that we interviewed, the labour represents 1-2% of the total cost in China in module 
production segment; in developed countries it represents 5-10%. 
vii
 http://www.enf.cn/ is an online Solar company database. 
viii
 The number of equipment providers is the only, admittedly rough, indicator available to measure the country 
market shares as turnover data are seldom available. 
ix
 Information obtained on the companies’ website: http://www.suntech-power.com; http://www.trinasolar.com ; 
http://www.solarfun-power.com. 
x
 You can refer to annex 2 for more information concerning the methodology used. 
xi
 For further details, see annex 2, Limits of the indicator 
xii
http://ep.espacenet.com  is a free online service developed by the European Patent Office for 
searching information on patent and patent application.  
